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THE METHOD OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT.

I.

TWICE in the history of the United States the nation has been

brought to the verge of civil war by difficulties growing out

of presidential elections. And yet no system was ever devised with

more care to preclude any reasonable complaint.

The plan of the Constitution was that the people of each State

should select of their best and wisest men a number corresponding

to their representation in the two Houses of Congress, and that

these should be free to cast their suffrages for two persons who in

their judgment were Taest qualified to perform the duties of the

presidential office. When the aggregate of all the votes was can-

vassed, the person having the highest number, if a majority of all,

was to become the president, and the person having the next high-

est number the vice-president. The theory was that by this method

the person indicated by the best judgment of the nation as the

fittest to preside over its destinies must in all probability be chosen.

In the very improbable contingency that the two persons receiving

the highest number should also receive an equal number, the votes

of the States, cast by their representatives in the Lower House of

Congress, were to determine the result between them.

The theory failed miserably and utterly twelve years after the plan

was first carried into effect. It was shown in the presidential elec-

tion of 1800 that under its workings a person whom no man's judg-

ment or purpose had selected for the first position might receive and

was likely to receive as many votes as the person whom the same
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electors had intended to prefer by their suffrages, and that when the

election was transferred to the House of Representatives, the former,

though never intended for any other than the subordinate position,

might possibly be chosen over th.e real choice of a majority of the

electors. On that occasion, Mr. Burr, though probably not the

choice of a single elector, might have been and probably would

have been chosen but for the patriotism of Mr. Hamilton and a few
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others among the Federalists who protested against it. But Mr.

Jefferson's election was not accomplished until after the subject of

filling the position in some extra-constitutional mode had been

mooted, the attempt to do which would probably have been resisted

with force.

The amendment to the Constitution thereupon adopted changed

the plan only in this particular: it left the electors to make their

individual selections between the persons to be named by them and

intended for the first and second stations. The theory still was,

that the States would select their wisest and best men as electors,

and these were to be left to the untrammeled exercise of their

judgments in making choice of persons for president and vice-

president.

If this theory can be said to have ever been fully accepted in

practice, it must be admitted that it was soon lost sight of. As

early, at least, as 1828 it was wholly and finally discarded, and

from that time the persons who were to receive the suffrages of the

electors were selected for them in advance, and they as mere auto-

mata were the instruments in registering the will of those who had

voted for them. So utterly and so miserably had the theory failed,

that long before 1876 it had come to be thought that an elector

who should do the very thing contemplated by the Constitution,

namely, act upon his own independent judgment in deciding for •

whom he should cast his votes, would be guilty of a treachery so

foul and a betrayal of trust so heinous, that the life-long scorn and
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contempt of mankind could but imperfectly indicate the punish-

ment he deserved.

The failure of the theory, however/but partially marks the great

change that took place at the election of 1828. Before that time

the electors were supposed to select a chief executive who should

impartially administer its affairs for the benefit of all. The interest

that centered in the election depended mainly upon the political is-

sues involved, and it would be slight or powerful in proportion as

these were deemed important. The personal interests, though these

were strong with some, did not engage any large number of per-

sons, because no large number could be injured by the success of

one candidate or benefited by the success of the other. After 1828

all was changed. The president was chosen as the head of a party,

and the choice was of a party rather than of an officer. It was ex-

pected he would administer the office so as to secure and perpetu-

ate the party ascendency, and that he would make use of the
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appointing power, having in view ds a prime object the strengthening

of the party and of the persons who had made him their leader and

their organ. And at length it came to be thought that this employ-

ment of patronage could only be wisely made for the interests of

the party by the representatives of the party in Congress, and that

its distribution was a proper and legitimate part of the machinery

of party administration and government.

This change brought into the presidential elections a new

element of great potency and of pervading influence. The issues

at stake had still their power; the interests men had in the candi-

dates still made them anxious and active; but beyond these were

the interests centered upon three or four score thousands of offices,

of every grade of emolument and prominence, and located in every

part of the country. To sorrle of these, men of every grade of

ability, attainments, and character would aspire, and looking upon

them as the prizes of party success, each man would struggle for the

great success which made their attainment possible, with an energy

proportioned to his desires, and with such scrupulousness and

such only as could be expected when the interests, desires, and

passions were all impelling in one direction. It therefore results

that in every part of the country once in four years the electors are

excited by feelings connected with the presidential election which

• in the early elections were almost wholly unknown, and which now

would not be called into activity if only the chief offices of the

government were in question. This makes the election enlist all
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the feelings, excite all the passions, and involve all the dangers

usually accompanying the choice of an elective king: two parties

divide the nation, who not only contend over the policy that shall

govern the state, but over the personal advantages and disadvan-

tages that the result involves; every ambitious man sees his per-

sonal interest involved in the struggle, and every unscrupulous man

who is also ambitious feels the temptation to employ unfair means

to accomplish the desired result when honest means are inadequate.

And unfortunately the machinery of elections, with the possibility

of perverting it for defeating the will of the people, is largely in the

hands of those who are deeply interested in the result.

All the evils of this system were made painfully conspicuous in

the election of 1876. For reasons which need not be stated, the

people of the country had lost confidence in many of the active

men on both sides in several of the Southern States, and each party

believed that its opponents would resort to any measures, not
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excluding violence to the extent of taking of human life, to give

the votes of their States to their party candidates. The whole

country was excited by charges of crime and outrage, and each

party believed that wrongs were being committed for personal and

party ends, though each party charged the wrongs upon its oppo-

nents. For three months the country was presented with the specter

of a disputed succession; and so intense was the feeling, that it

seemed highly probable that, at the risk of civil war, one house of

Congress would declare one candidate chosen, and the other would

declare the election of his opponent. Happily all danger was averted

by the adoption in Congress of a novel expedient, well adapted for

the emergency, but only to be justified by the extremity of danger.

The ship of state passed in safety the threatening headlands; but

the country is thoroughly warned, that in any close election the

falsification of the result is not so difficult that unscrupulous men

are not likely to contemplate it; and the principle, apparently settled

by the action of the Electoral Commission, that the State returns

must be accepted as conclusive, makes the remedy exceedingly

uncertain, if dishonest men, who have control of the State machinery

of elections, shall venture to employ it to defeat the will of the

people.

Brought thus face to face with the great danger, the problem of

a suitable and effectual remedy forces itself upon the attention of

the country. To solve it, some turn their attention to new modes

of election; others, to new modes of guarding and verifying the
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result. The following changes might be suggested:

1. Let the president be chosen for a shorter term; say for one

year only, or for two. This would so far diminish the value of the

office in a party sense, and the value of all depending upon it, that

the temptation to unscrupulous conduct would to a great extent be

removed. But while this may be true, it is also true that this short

term would keep the nation in a perpetual and unendurable dis-

turbance, which business interests and the comfort of the people

could not tolerate.

2. Let the term be extended to eight or ten years. This would

give a longer period of quiet, and reduce in proportion as the time

was extended the number of dangerous crises. But, as it would

render the value of party success much greater, it would intensify

all the present evils, and sooner or later bring upon us the fate of

all elective monarchies.

3- Let the electoral college be dispensed with, and the electors
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of each State cast their suffrages for the men of their choice for

president and vice-president, thus having a freedom of choice which

is now denied them. But as each State would cast its vote separately

from the others, and have a voice in proportion to its representation

in the two houses of Congress, this change would be more nominal

than real. The candidates would be presented then, as now, by con-

ventions, and whoever did not vote for those thus selected would

cast an uninfluentfal ballot. The evils would be precisely the same

as'now, and the dangers the same; and all the temptations which

now lead men to control elections, by fear, force, or fraud, or to

falsify results, would exist in full force.

4. Let the president be chosen by the popular vote of the whole

country aggregated. To bring this about, it would be requisite that

the smaller States consent to waive their present advantage in rep-

resentation; and this they are not at all likely to do. But suppos-

ing them to do so, the evils and dangers would remain the same

as now, with a single but very important exception, namely, that

the temptation to tamper with returns would be greatly weakened,

because it must be seldom that the result could be thus controlled.

To take for an illustration the case of the election of 1844: Mr. Polk

had a plurality in the Union over Mr. Clay of nearly forty thousand,

and to overcome this by fraud would have required operations on a

scale so enormous that it would have been practically impossible,

while comparatively a small fraud might have controlled the vote

of New York, which under the existing system would have con-
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trolled the general result. And in nearly every instance the plu-

rality on the popular vote has been very much greater than it was

in the instance named.

5. Preserve the electoral colleges, but let the electors be chosen

in the States by districts. This system would have the apparent

advantage, that it can not be known in advance that the election can

depend upon any single count or return, as it frequently is known

* when an election by States is being canvassed. It also has the ad-

vantage that minorities in States thereby obtain a representation

in the electoral college. Still it is by no means certain that the

general result is more likely to be just, or more in accordance with

the popular voice. And the plan is subject to one objection, the

seriousness of which it is difficult to over-estimate. Districts for

such a purpose must be prescribed and denned by the legislature;

and it is notorious that congressional districts are now gerryman-

dered in the interests of party to an extent that often leaves the
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minority in a State smarting under a perpetual sense of wrong.

The temptation to abuse in this direction would of course be in-

creased enormously if the election of president might depend

upon it.

6. Let the president be chosen by the concurrent vote of the

two houses of Congress, and in case of disagreement, by vote in

joint convention. If such a method could relieve us of any exist-

ing evils, it is difficult to understand how or why. It would cer-

tainly introduce some new evils. It is one of the few fortunate

things in the existing party methods that the nominations are in-

trusted to conventions, and not, as formerly, left to the persons

selected for legislation. But if the members of Congress were not

only to nominate but to elect, and if, as would be likely to be the

case, the candidates or a portion of them were members, the legis-

tive halls would become not merely the arena for party contests,

but the battle-ground for factions within the parties, and the inter-

ests of legislation would inevitably be subordinated to the interests

of rival candidates. If we could suppose such a system in operation

in a time of excitement like that of 1876, when some most impor-

tant and delicate interests upon which the peace of the nation de-

pended were demanding attention, we can form some judgment what

chance such interests would have of being treated calmly and dispas-

sionately, when the gratification of the highest political ambition of

the leading members might depend upon their acting in harmony

with the prevailing popular sentiment or passion. Of the general
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result of such a change in the mode of election, only this could be

predicted with absolute certainty, that it could not possibly be in

the direction of settled order, or of a more just and dispassionate

consideration and administration of public affairs.

7. Let the English system of constitutional government be in-

troduced, under which the executive shall be required to conform,

on alt important questions of policy and administration, to the sen-

timents of the controlling majority in the popular branch in Con-

gress. This is sometimes vaguely suggested as a desirable change,

but we have seen.no attempt to indicate the details of the change.

Under the English system the nominal executive is permanent, and

is a figure-head rather than an effective officer: the actual power

being intrusted to those who compose the administration, the lead-

ing member of which, and not the monarch, is the real head of the

government for the time being. The presidential office, on the

other hand, when administered on the constitutional theory, is a
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great and overshadowing power, and the cabinet officers are only

the servants of the executive. To reduce the presidential office to

a level in political power with the kingly office in Britain, and still

fill it by election every four years, would seem to be an absurdity,

not only because of the comparative unimportance of the office,

but because the real election upon which the public measures

would depend would not be the presidential, but the congressional.

Moreover, the question might then seriously be raised whether

this office might not be dispensed with altogether, as one to which

no important function would attach. In England the queen attracts

to her person the loyalty of the people, and is always the central

figure of the conservative forces of British institutions. In Ameri-

can institutions an elective officer can fill no corresponding place;

and unless the president were to be made the active and responsi-

ble head of the government as the prime minister in England is

now, and were to be expected to retire with his associates when he

found the popular sentiment against him, his only importance

would seem to be, to keep up a nominal continuity in executive

authority. And if this were to be the sole function, the more the

term should be lengthened the better.

But to adapt the English system to our institutions would re-

quire greater and more numerous changes than could be indicated

in this short paper. And when these were made, it would probably

fail at its first real trial. It works well in Britain; but vastly less

depends upon a change there than with us. First. The change does
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not affect the nominal head of the government, or the royal family;

and in the permanency of these is a social force of the highest im-

portance. Second. It does not, directly or remotely, affect the mem-

bership in the Upper House of Parliament; and a very considerable

proportion of the seats in the Commons are held by a tenure so

secure, that the changes in public sentiment and in administrations

do not in the least affect them. And, third, the number of places

dependent upon a change of administration is comparatively small.

It is therefore to a very large proportion of all the men in politics

no personal sacrifice at all when their party is invited to recognize

the admonition of an adverse vote in the Commons, and make way

for their antagonists; and they are expected to retire gracefully

and without factious resistance—as they usually do. But put at

stake every important office under the government, general and

local—the offices possessed and the offices-hoped for—and the sys-

tem would at once be subjected to 3uch a strain as in Britain it has
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never felt, and never can feel. To expect that the leaders, having

in their hands all the great and manifold advantages which individ-

uals can derive from the possession of the government and the dis-

tribution of its patronage, will readily accept and act upon the evi-

dences of popular disapprobation, and surrender these advantages

without faction and unconstitutional resistance, is to expect more

of the fairness and candor of human nature than the experience

of mankind will justify.

None of the suggested changes seem to promise satisfactory re-

sults of much value. But there are those who believe that all the

substantial evils and dangers which now attend presidential elec-

tions may be obviated or counteracted by precautions which may be

devised and enacted by Congress. This is a hopeful view to take;

but it is not to be overlooked, that we have gone on for ninety years

endeavoring to cure defects as they appeared, and that the evils

were confessedly more enormous in the last election than in any

that preceded it. They have also been greater of late in State elec-

tions than ever before. The laws which are devised for the regula-

tion of elections in New York have been carefully drawn, and should

be efficient to prevent frauds; but it is notorious that for years

they only served to foster and to cover them. Many persons at

one time believed that good registration laws must be almost a com-

plete protection against illegal voting; but it has been discovered

that, with the connivance of election officers, they may easily be

made most efficient and dangerous aids in defeating the popular
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will. Every new device to check fraud seems only to quicken the

fraudulent invention.

To remedy any great evil, it is essential to keep in view the causes.

For the wrongs < and abuses connected with the electoral system

there are doubtless many causes, but the chief of all is notorious

and open to the most common observation. So long as the whole

civil service of the country depends upon the result of presidential

elections; so long as the interests and the gratification of the de-

sires and ambitions of a host of active and persistent men in every

State—many of them in public life, and occupying places of trust

in connection with the management of elections—so long as all

these are made to depend for their advancement and satisfaction

upon the result of a single election, it is vain to hope that fairness

will always characterize the proceedings, and that temptation will

never overcome the integrity of those who are in position to tamper

with the results. Still more idle is it to expect that suspicions
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apparently well grounded will not often spring up—that wrongs have

been committed which rob the people of their rights as freemen,

and for which the law affords no means of redress. It is a great

trial to any system of government to subject it to periodical changes

in its chief ruler; and the danger must be in proportion to the

desirableness of that which depends upon it. In a great and pow-

erful nation like ours, ambition discovers many splendid prizes be-

sides the first and greatest; and we keep the danger at its maximum

when we make all these depend upon the result of a single great

trial of strength between two parties commonly nearly equal in

numbers, and who, besides the offices involved, find enough in the

political issues to enlist their feelings and interests quite as much

as is reasonably prudent and safe. To reduce the danger to a mini-

mum, it is requisite that as few things as possible which are intensely

desired be staked upon the result. Thomas M. Coolev.

II.

THE tendency of all machinery is to wear out or to become

obsolete. Political machinery is no exception to this rule. Re-

pair, renewal, and substitution are necessary for its operation.

The history of the British Constitution affords the most striking

and convincing proof of the truth of this statement. Being un-

written, and absolutely under the control of Parliament, the work

of reparation and improvement is made easy, and perpetually pro-

ceeds. It is otherwise with the Constitution of the United States.

Whether defects be developed by experience or improvements be
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made necessary by progress, it is alike subject to a tedious process

of amendment, which never succeeds until the grievance becomes

too great for endurance. It requires a great danger or a great

shock to confidence, like that given by the issue of the presidential

election of 1876, in order to arouse the public mind to action.

The Constitution intended that the people should choose their

own.rulers and servants, according to the methods which it pre-

scribes. But every intelligent citizen knows that the people have

not exercised this right of choice for many years. The early Presi-

dents were undoubtedly the men whom the people desired to fill

this high position, but since the time of Jackson, it is doubtful

whether more than two of our Presidents have been the men who

would have been elected if the people had been free to choose.
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Although they have long since lost the right to choose, they have,

however, always retained and exercised the power of rejection.

They have possessed a veto power on candidates, and have been

able to say whom they would not have to rule over them. In other

words, from the time when national conventions came into exist-

ence, the power of the people to decide upon nominations was lost,

but the power to reject the nominees still survived. When the

caucus system broke down, because it ceased to give expression to

the popular voice, primary elections were substituted, and for a

time proved efficacious, because the adherents of the respective par-

ties voted at them for delegates, and the inspectors truly declared

the result. But it was soon arranged by the men who make a trade

of politics, that the inspectors at these elections should declare elected

the delegates who had been previously agreed upon in secret; and

although the formality of voting is still kept up, it is understood on

all hands to be a farce. It is notorious that the power to name the

inspectors involves the power to determine the result, so that pri-

mary elections are now, in fact, a device by which the office-holders

in esse, or the office-holders in posse, perpetuate themselves in power

or in expectancy. This machinery works very smoothly, and always

succeeds until the yoke becomes intolerable, when the people have

been able, by a strong effort, to eject the existing regime from

power, without knowing or even caring much who would come in

their place. Tweed and his Ring is a familiar example of how this

process worked in the city of New York. The same machinery is
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still working in this city, under very different control, however; but

symptoms of restiveness have of late developed themselves, which

recently caused the defeat of a leading regular candidate. But as

in this recent experience the people had no option as to the candi-

date who was chosen, so, even if the revolution should extend, and

become general, the people can only break up the control of the

existing powers, without being able to choose the powers which will

be substituted. Still, it is something to be able to dismiss ; and so

long as this right survives, the existence of constitutional govern-

ment based on universal suffrage may be regarded as safe.

But in the late presidential election means were found to take

, away from the people the right to say which party should not rule.

No one doubts that the popular voice declared against the con-

tinued rule of the Republican party, and yet the Republican candi-

dates were duly inaugurated, and to-day administer the government.

The power of the office-holders to perpetuate themselves in office,
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heretofore local, has thus become nationalized. Let no one suppose

that the knowledge thus acquired will be lost. On the contrary, if

local experience be any guide, we may surely believe that repetition

will follow this success, and that successful usurpation will intrench

itself against future attacks. Henceforth, forcible revolution will

be the only resource against usurpation, unless the patriotism and

wisdom of the people and their representatives can provide a speedy

and certain method of giving effect to the will of the people, when

they demand a change of administration.

The present system has culminated, and found its grave in " re-

turning boards," which must either be eliminated or become as uni-

versal and as delusive as primary elections. How to get rid of this

cunning device for substituting the will of the office-holders for

the voice of the people is the problem to be solved, if free govern-

ment is to survive on this continent.

The nature of the disease must be known in order that the pro-

per remedy may be applied. The returning board deals with the

vote of the State as a unit. Its action is therefore very simple and

very effective. If its return as to the vote of the State be final, then

it has merely to declare the vote of the State in accordance with the

political preference of the returning board, and the work is done.

The action of the Electoral Commission in regard to Florida and

Louisiana settled this question for the first and last time. Here-

after all the States may be forced to resort to returning boards for

their own protection against returning boards in other States; and
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as returning boards will respond to the views of the State adminis-

tration, the great States will always have it in their power to make

the President. The thirty-five votes of New York will hereafter be

a powerful factor in the designation of Presidents. The control of

the political machinery in the several States will be the strategic

point in all future presidential contests, and the influence of money

will be potent hereafter to determine results.

The remedy is, therefore, to make it impossible for any return-

ing board to decide what the vote of the State is. The central sys-

tem must be abandoned, and the district system be substituted.

The district system divides the political control. The same party

does not rule in all the districts. Hence, if electors were chosen by

districts, the vote of the State would be divided. The results as to

all the electors would therefore practically be a division of the votes

between the parties, substantially in the ratio of {he division exist-

ing in the House of Representatives. The central political power
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resident at Washington thus far has been powerless in times when

the popular feeling is deeply moved, to exercise a controlling influ-

ence in the Congressional districts, and unless some new device is

contrived, the choice of electors would probably be free from undue

influence on the part of the national administration. Of course it

will still be possible for the State board of canvassers to perpetrate

frauds; but they would necessarily be subjected to the same scrutiny

as now exists in regard to members of Congress, and in practice no

glaring abuse is found to exist in this respect.

If, therefore, it should be deemed desirable to continue to

choose the President through the intermediate agency of electors,

it would seem indispensable to substitute the district for the gen-

eral ticket system now in vogue. The objection to the district

system is that the large States will lose their preponderating influ-

ence in the choice of President. But in fact there has heretofore

been no such preponderating influence, and if it did exist, it would

scarcely seem desirable to perpetuate it. If New York could

always make the President, it would be generally felt and conceded

to be an injustice to the other States, and New York would, if

wise, gladly surrender such an invidious privilege.

If the district system be resorted to as a substitute for the

broken-down general system, it may be asked whether it would not

simplify matters to intrust the election of President to Congress at

once, which, in the two houses, represents precisely the same elec-

toral constituencies as would control the choice of President. This
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suggestion would involve the meeting of the Senate and House in

joint convention, where the voting would be per capita, and not by

States. This would seem to be a feasible solution of the matter,

except for two objections.

1. The choice of President would not be made by the people, at

a special election, held for that express purpose.

2. Congress would become the centre of intrigue for the presi-

dency, and, in view of the magnitude of the stake, all other ques-

tions would yield to this, and general legislation would suffer in con-

sequence.

I do not regard the first objection as very serious, because mem-

bers of Congress would be elected with reference to the fact that

they were to choose the President, and as their functions would thus

be enlarged, it would tend to secure a better class of representa-

tives.

As to the second objection, I think it would be necessary to pro-
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hibit members of Congress who had elected a President from hold-

ing any federal office during his administration. This would be a

salutary regulation, even if the present system were continued. It

might occasionally deprive the administration of valuable assistance,

but it would relieve it of the chief embarrassments which are expe-

rienced on a change in the presidential office.

The real danger would be that, as each house is the judge of the

qualifications of its own members, the temptation to seat or unseat

members in order to gain the majority in the joint convention, and

thus make the President, would probably be irresistible whenever

the preponderance on one or the other side was slight. On the whole,

it would probably be safer to continue to choose electors whose only

function is to elect the President, and thus remove this exciting sub-

ject as far as possible from the halls of legislation.

Without expressing a decided opinion, however, finally in favor

of either of these methods, it seems clear to me the district system

is a better and safer method of choice than to elect by general ticket

in the several States. It brings the election nearer to the people,

and might possibly tend, in time, £0 give some discretion to the in-

dividual electors, according to the original idea of the Constitution.

In other words, I prefer distribution to concentration of electo-

ral force. In this way, the veto power of the people on nomina-

tions can at least be preserved, and I should not despair of the re-

covery of the positive power to elect the man of their choice to the

presidency, especially if the vote were made direct for President by-
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name, still preserving the district system, and counting the vote of

each district as one vote for the candidate who might have the ma-

jority of votes in the district. As to details, however, it is scarcely

necessary, at this stage of the discussion, to express decided

opinions. The great thing is to secure the substitution of the dis-

trict system in presidential elections for the general ticket plan,

which unscrupulous politicians have learned how to use for the pur-

pose of defeating the will of the people.

As to the two electors in each State corresponding to the senators,

they could be elected on a general ticket, and the electoral colleges

should settle all contested seats, in order that no disputes in regard

to electoral votes should ever be submitted to Congress.

The function of Congress should be limited to meeting in joint

convention for the mere ministerial duty of receiving, opening, and

counting the votes of the electoral colleges, and, if the count shows

that no candidate has a majority of all the votes, to proceed to elect
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as President, viva voce, one of the three highest candidates, each sen-

ator and representative having one vote, and the candidate receiving

a majority of all the votes thus cast shall be declared President. In

case of a tie, the Speaker of the House, as representing the people,

should have the casting vote.

The chief merit of this suggestion is that it would seem, at least

at the outset, to secure a definite result without any considerable

departure from the existing methods to which the people have be-

come accustomed. Doubtless politicians would sooner or later con-

trive some device to nullify the will of the people; but unless the

electoral colleges in the several States send in double returns, it is

not easy to see how the power to perpetrate any fraud will reside

in Congress. But double returns from any State could only occur

from two electoral colleges being organized, in which case the ques-

tion of legality should be settled in the State courts, and a copy of

the record of judgment should be final and conclusive on Congress.

The result of the deliberations of the committees of the Senate

and House now considering this question so vital to the future des-

tiny of this country will, it is to be hoped, solve the problem in a

satisfactory manner. In making these suggestions, I do not pretend

to prejudge their conclusions, which I expect to be able to support,

because the committees are so composed as to be entitled to the

confidence of the country.
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